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                                 Due to the dynamics of the glass packaging market, 
Verallia competes with large international players as well 
as small domestic competitors. When looking at the 
transaction history of the top five players since 2005, one 
can analyse that, especially in Europe, there has been a 
strong consolidation within the industry, as reflected by c. 
71% of the market being covered by respective players. 
Therefore, since organic market share gains are for the 
above stated reason rather not feasible, the following report 
analyses the strategic rationales and potential impact of the 
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This report is part of the “Verallia SAS, a leader in glass packaging” equity research report  
(annexed) and should be read has an integral part of it. 
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Glass packaging – competitive landscape 
Verallia is the largest producer of glass packaging in Europe and the third biggest worldwide, 
operating in three main regions – SWE, NEE and LA. Due to the different market dynamics, with 
Europe being a consolidated market while the market in Latin America is still rather fragmented, 
Verallia competes with international corporations such as Vetropack, BA Glass, Ardagh Group, 
OI-Glass and Wiegand Glass as well as local companies, such as Cattorini (Argentina) or Cristoro 
(Chile), partially as the high cost of transportation, for a relatively low unit value, makes long-
distance transport unviable. Table 1 further illustrates Verallia’s competitive landscape and 
competitors’ end-markets.  
Table 1: Illustrative competitive landscape in the glass packaging industry 
Source: Own analysis, company information 
 
Figure 1: Share price performance since Verallia's IPO (rebased to Verallia) 
Source: CapitalIQ as per 31-Dec-20 
As shown in the figure above, all major listed glass packaging players have suffered large losses 
in mid-2020 due to the global COVID-19 pandemic. However, while all players have recovered to 
their respective share price levels around Verallia’s IPO date and up to 38.5% beyond, it is worth 
Verallia competes 
with local players as 





compared to its 
competitors  
since IPO  
noting that Verallia itself only marginally increased its share price by 3.4%. 
Figure 2: EBITDA margin development of European glass packaging players 
Source: Own analysis and research, CapitalIQ, company information 
Table 2: Competitor benchmarking of listed glass packaging providers (as of FY’19) 
Source: Own analysis, CapitalIQ as per 31-Dec-20 
Figure 2 gives an overview of the EBITDA margins of the European businesses of the largest 
players as well as the historical EBITDA margin development of listed glass packaging players 
since 2005. Table 2 goes more into detail, by comparing main financial performance indicators 
of listed competitors with Verallia, as further analysed in the following.        
Verallia’s working capital management is in the upper range. Verallia possesses the lowest 
collection period among its competitors, which contributes significantly towards a low cash 
conversion cycle and lower need for external financing to fund daily operations. The fast collection 
period is mainly driven by Verallia’s significant engagement in receivables factoring amounting to 
roughly €483m in FY’19. In terms of the inventory held period, Verallia’s management aims for 
future reductions, as a result of ongoing evaluations and the implementation of further efficiency 
measures. Finally, Verallia’s payables outstanding period is the shortest among its competitors, 
offering significant room for improvement through the renegotiation of supplier contracts and 
therefore, further lowering the requirement for external capital funding. 
While for all in Table 2 presented metrics, one can analyse clear differences based on the 
company’s regional focus on either the US or Europe1, we believe these differences only for the 
following metrics to be noteworthy. 
In terms of main cost items, COGS and SG&A figures are not comparable across regions, as US 
focused players and Verallia include most of the personnel expenses in COGS, whereas Europe 
focused players incorporate a higher amount of personnel expenses in the SG&A figure. 
 
1 Competitors mainly active in the US include Ardagh Group and OI-Glass, while Vidrala, Vetropack, Zignago Vetro and Verallia operate mainly in Europe 
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Additionally, as shown in Table 2, the general level of costs for US focused players is higher 
(~89% vs. ~62% in Europe), which is reflected in respectively lower EBITDA margins compared 
to Europe focused competitors. Margins in Europe comfortably surpass US ones by up to ~11%, 
with most European players having margins in the mid 20% range.  
Capex needs also differ between US or Europe focused players. While US focused players show 
an average Capex of between ~6% and ~7% of their sales depending on the year, Europe 
focused players invest more, with Capex levels averaging between ~14% and ~18% of sales. It 
is noteworthy that Verallia’s Capex levels were relatively low compared to competitors in Europe 
historically, mainly driven by the execution of several efficiency initiatives as part of the ongoing 
implementation of the company’s Performance Action Plan (PAP), which comprises 500 initiatives 
aimed at reducing cash production costs and Capex spending. In terms of Capex, the PAP 
initiatives yielded higher production capacities of various plants, totalling 48kT in FY’19, without 
the need of additional investments. 
Finally, the regional focus of the glass packaging players also seems to significantly affect the 
leverage ratio. While Europe focused players, including Verallia, have rather low Net 
debt/EBITDA ratios ranging from 1.2x to 2.8x, US-focused players operate with an average 
leverage multiple of 4.6x. 
 
M&A Scenario Analysis – Saverglass  
The glass packaging industry is characterised by a strong consolidation trend as further detailed 
in the next section, making suitable acquisition targets a rare opportunity. As of Feb-20, 
Mergermarket stated that Carlyle is expected to explore a sale of its in 2016 acquired French 
premium glass packaging portfolio company Saverglass. The article cited six sources that are 
familiar with the matter. The sale could launch as early as in H2 2020 with an estimated enterprise 
value of €600m, according to one source. Five sources cited Verallia as a potential comparable, 
while the sale is expected to attract a broad universe of potential investors, including private equity 
players. The article named OI-Glass and Vidrala as other potential comparables. Due to 
Saverglass’ focus on premiumisation, French background, and domestic production sites and 
Verallia’s declared intention to evaluate potential acquisition opportunities, we believe it is worth 
exploring the implications and value creation of such acquisition in the following. However, at this 
stage, we want to point out that, as Saverglass is a French private company, the data available 
from the company is limited to its company website as well as its financial statements.2 Therefore, 
the following analysis was only conducted for illustrative purposes and cannot be compared with 
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Excursus – Glass packaging industry consolidation 
Figure 3: Acquisitions of Verallia’s top five competitors since 2005 
Source: Own analysis, Mergermarket 
Over the last two decades, the competitive landscape of Verallia has changed a lot, mainly driven 
by a strong industry consolidation in Europe. Accordingly, the market share of the top five players 
in Europe increased from <50% in the early 2000’s, to roughly 71% in 2019 (Figure 4). Analysing 
the transaction history of Verallia’s top five competitors, our findings are backed by raw data 
shown above, further highlighting the industry consolidation across different regions. As shown 
in Figure 3, most of the transactions took place in Europe and Latin America. Moreover, when 
analysing the transaction history of the respective competitors, it is noteworthy that OI-Glass, 
Ardagh Group as well as BA Glass lead the consolidation, by closing 11, 5 and 5 deals with 
accumulated deal values of €3.2bn, €2.9bn and €1.0bn since 2005, respectively. In contrast, even 
though Verallia has confirmed its desire to acquire mid-market companies in the H1 2020 
earnings press conference, Verallia has not made acquisitions since the company was carved 
out from the Saint Gobain conglomerate and acquired by Apollo in 2015. While suited 
opportunities are becoming rare in Europe due to the consolidated nature of the industry, we see 
significant acquisition opportunities of mid-market companies in existing markets in Latin America 
as well as expansion opportunities to new markets, such as China and Mexico.  
Figure 4: European food & beverage glass packaging market 
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Finally, Table 3 summarises precedent transactions in the glass packaging industry since 2005. 
Table 3: Precedent transactions in the glass packaging industry since 2005 
Source: Mergermarket 
Saverglass at a glance 
Saverglass is an industrial group, based in Feuquières, France, and a specialist in producing, 
decorating, and customising modern, versatile and original high-end and luxury glass bottles for 
wines and spirits and employs approximately 3,500 employees. Saverglass provides its products 
to the prestige spirit, fine wine, sparkling wine, champagne, premium and super-premium markets 
and offers a product portfolio of over 250 lines with products ranging from 5cl to 6l volume. 
Table 4: Saverglass' positioning in the glass bottle market 
Source: Saverglass 
Saverglass customers include, among others, Rémy Cointreau, Pernod Ricard, Campari, Martini, 
Diageo, Hennessy, Bacardi and Grey Goose vodka. Apart from exporting to over 100 countries, 
the company operates six glass production factories and four decoration sites on three continents 
and is represented in over ten countries including Europe, Russia, Mexico, the Caribbean, the 
US, Central America, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa. The company, with production 
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Figure 5: Saverglass  
revenue splits 
Figure 6: Saverglass key financials 
Source: Own analysis and estimates 
On a general note, the aim of the following analysis is the illustration of the potential acquisition 
scenario and not the valuation of Saverglass itself. Hence, the respective valuation will not be 




As every merger or acquisition above a certain size is subject to antitrust approval, we believe it 
to be appropriate to briefly address current regulations. Generally, as this acquisition would 
mainly concern the EU, either the local competition authorities or when certain criteria are met, 
the EU Commission examines the transaction based on the Council Regulation (EC) No 
139/2004. The proposed acquisition of Saverglass falls within the authority of the EU 
Commission, since 1) the combined turnover of the NewCo exceeds €2.5bn 2) the NewCo 
generates over €100m in revenue per member state in three EU member states 3) each company 
generates over €100m in revenue in EU member states and 4) both companies each generate 
over €25m in revenue in three member states. Finally, the main goal of the EU Commission is to 
maintain competition on the market, to avoid the creation of dominant corporations, which could 
increase prices for the general consumer. Based on this general principle and after an 
investigation, the EU Commission either clears the merger, prohibits the merger, or approves the 
acquisition based on certain commitments (remedies) of the two parties. As further shown in 
Figure 4 and based on our estimated market shares (Figure 10), we believe the European glass 
packaging market still experiences significant competition after the transaction, especially from 
OI-Glass, Ardagh Group, Vidrala, BA Glass and Vetropack, which all possess significant market 
share and, therefore, see no reason for the proposed transaction not to be cleared. Moreover, as 
the implied market shares of Saverglass in Figure 10 was based on Verallia’s total addressable 
market3, which does just partially (only Europe and Russia) match the total addressable market 
of Saverglass due to its operations in e.g., Mexico, the Caribbean, the US, Central America, New 
Zealand, Australia and South Africa, the real post-transaction market share gain of Verallia is 
estimated to be lower, which, thus, may give the respective competition authorities little room for 
concerns with regards to the proposed transaction. However, this evaluation solely reflects our 
opinion, which is by no means indicative for the final decision of competition authorities 
investigating the proposed transaction. 
 
3 Total addressable market refers to the sum of market values of all countries Verallia operates in (Southern and Western Europe (SWE), Nothern and Eastern Europe (NEE) and 
Latin America (LA)). Market shares are based on the by each company generated revenue, in relation to the total addressable market size 
Strategic rationales 
There has been no update on whether a sale process for Saverglass has already been launched 
or if Carlyle’s plans regarding the rumoured sale have changed in the light of the global COVID-
19 pandemic. Nevertheless, we identified several qualitative as well as quantitative rationales for 
Verallia that would support exploring the acquisition of Saverglass once the asset is on the 
market, depending on the acquisition price. As a general note, we want to mention again that 
Saverglass is a private company and thus, to date, investors could not invest in Saverglass on a 
standalone basis. 
- Acquisition supports trend for premiumisation: The market volume growth for vodka and 
gin in the premium segment is expected to outperform the growth of standard products, 
achieving CAGRs of 4.6% and 4.8% between 2020 and 2024, while the total market volume 
for vodka and gin is expected to grow with CAGRs of only 1.3% and 4.0%, respectively. 
Likewise, the market for premium and above wines is estimated to grow with a CAGR of 2% 
between 2018 and 2023, compared to a CAGR of -1% for standard and value wines 
according to Wine Intelligence estimates. Since Saverglass is exclusively focused on high-
end bottles and distributes its activities only in the wine and spirits sector, Verallia could 
accelerate further growth by acquiring Saverglass. 
Figure 7: Verallia vs. NewCo pro-forma revenue split 
Source: Verallia, own analysis 
- More favourable revenue split: Due to Saverglass’ focus on wine and spirits for the 
premium, ultra-premium and prestige bottle market, Verallia will be exposed to a more 
favourable product mix due to the aforementioned higher growth estimates. (Figure 7) 
- Becoming the global #2 player: While Verallia has a leading position in all major markets 
the company operates in, being the #1 player in Europe, the #2 player in Latin America and 
the #3 player globally4, an acquisition of Saverglass would increase Verallia’s yearly sales 
volume by 500kT, making the company effectively surpass Ardagh Group’s glass packaging 
business in terms of revenue and, therefore, becoming the global #2 glass packaging player 
with only OI-Glass still being significantly ahead. (Figure 8) 
- Further penetration of new markets: While Verallia currently focuses on certain countries 
in Europe and Latin America, the acquisition of Saverglass could diversify Verallia’s 
geographical footprint by enabling market entry into new markets, namely Australia, Central 
 
4 Company information supported by own anaylsis 
Figure 8:  
Illustrative market overview 
America, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, the Caribbean and the US as illustrated by 
Figure 9. 
Figure 9: Combined geographical footprint 
Source: Company information, own analysis 
- Gain in market share: Due to the strong consolidation trend of the glass packaging industry, 
in Europe, the top five players represent c. 71% of the market. Therefore, compared to less 
consolidated markets, market share gains are organically hard to realise since well-
established top players compete with a lower number of smaller companies to steal market 
share from. Combined with Saverglass, Verallia is estimated to be able to increase its market 
share of the by Verallia addressable market (regions SWE, NEE, LA) as shown in Figure 
10.5 
Figure 10: Illustrative post-acquisition pro-forma market share estimates 
Source: Own analysis and estimates 
- Potential for synergies: Since the glass bottle manufacture is a very capital-intensive process 
and both, Saverglass and Verallia, have production capabilities especially in France, we believe 
the combined company to potentially profit from lower raw material costs, resulting from an 
increased purchasing power. Additionally, we believe the combined company can potentially 
further realise SG&A synergies. However, since Saverglass discloses only very limited publicly 
available information to conduct a respective analysis, we have analysed precedent transactions 
 
5 As the illustrative market share of Saverglass in Figure 10 was based on Verallia’s total addressable market, which is not completly covered by Saverglass, the real market 
share of Saverglass is estimated to be lower 
with regards to announced synergies within the glass packaging and food and beverage 
packaging industry in order to draw conclusions about the potential synergy creation, implied by 
the acquisition of Saverglass. (Table 6)  
 
Indicative valuation of Saverglass as of Dec-20 
In order to value Saverglass, we followed a to Verallia similar valuation approach and chose to 
additionally look at precedent transactions to incorporate the potential acquisition premium. For 
our DCF, we forecasted Saverglass’ revenue to grow in line with market values of France’s glass 
packaging industry, as Saverglass does not disclose a detailed country split and assumed 
constant market shares going forward.6 We based our WACC on Saverglass’ peers, by 
determining their average unlevered beta and used their respective average capital structure to 
relever it. We chose the 10-year French government bond yield for the risk-free rate and used a 
synthetic rating by Damodaran to calculate the cost of debt. Finally, we used the same market 
risk premium as for Verallia. Our valuation implies an enterprise value of €673m and an equity 
value of €489m. 
Table 5: Indicative valuation of Saverglass 
Source: Own analysis and estimates, CapitalIQ as per 31-Dec-20 
Merger Model – Input assumptions and implications 
In the following section, additionally to the beforehand described strategic rationales, we will 
further detail the input assumptions and value creation scenarios of a potential acquisition of 
Saverglass by Verallia. Due to the potential launch of a sale of Saverglass as early as in H2 2020, 





6 Our forecast is based on constant margins, market value growth is based on GDP growth estimates from IMF 
7 Due to the nature of Saverglass being a private company and therefore, little publicly available information, we assume a lock box closing date as of  
31-Dec-20, even if the acquisistion is announced in H1 2021 
 
Potential financing structure of the acquisition 
Verallia has the possibility to finance the acquisition with cash, debt or stock. We took a closer 
look at the respective options and determined Verallia’s firepower. 
Usually, cash constitutes the cheapest option to finance a transaction. To calculate Verallia’s 
maximum available cash consideration, we looked at the pre-deal combined cash balance and 
established a conservative minimum cash balance by applying the 25th percentile of the cash as 
percentage of revenue ratio of the peer group (5.5% of combined revenue), resulting in a cash 
availability of c. €106m.  
Verallia could also use debt financing. Historically, Verallia was able to take on debt at a rather 
low contractual interest rate of EURIBOR (with floor 0%) + 1.50% margin. In order to determine 
the amount of leverage Verallia might be able to take on, we looked at the 60th percentile of total 
debt/EBITDA ratios of the peer group, which stood at 4.6x, still well below 5.0x adjusted EBITDA, 
the maximum leverage ratio set out by Verallia and applied it to the pro-forma EBITDA of the 
NewCo. We think this leverage ratio is justified, keeping in mind the strong cash generation of 
Verallia in the past and continuous deleveraging.  
Additionally, Verallia could finance the transaction by issuing stock. However, we believe 
Verallia will unlikely issue new shares, since we expect the company to be able to raise sufficient 
debt and, therefore, avoid giving up ownership and diluting its existing shareholder base for a 
share price, which is according to our valuation below its fair value. 
Following the assumptions above, we determined Verallia’s firepower to be €1,743m8, which 
significantly exceeds the total consideration needed to purchase Saverglass and concluded the 
financing structure as shown in Figure 12.  
Figure 11: Saverglass consideration and Verallia firepower analysis 
Source: Own analysis and estimates 
Figure 12: Potential transaction sources & uses table 
Source: Own analysis and estimates 
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NewCo synergy and value creation analysis  
As already stated in prior sections, due to the lack of detailed information available on Saverglass, 
a comprehensive and thorough analysis based on Saverglass’ and Verallia’s financial data is not 
possible. We have, therefore, looked at over 180 transactions within the glass packaging and 
general food and beverage packaging industries9 since 2005, with regards to announced and 
realised synergies, to determine the potential synergy level, as further illustrated by the table 
below. 
Table 6: Analysis of historically announced synergies within the food and beverage packaging 
industry
 
Table 6 (Analysis 1) shows the level of synergies that was announced at each transaction, at 
what percentages these synergies were phased-in, and finally, sets the announced targeted 
synergies in relation to the sales, COGS, SG&A and EBITDA of the respective target company. 
However, as most companies did not disclose a detailed split of expected synergies by cost type 
(COGS or SG&A), it is not possible to look at these cost items individually. We thus looked at the 
average announced synergies as percentage of the sales and EBITDA of the acquired targets 
and, for our analysis’ purposes, used this percentage to determine the equivalent level of 
synergies as a percentage of Saverglass’ COGS (Table 6, Analysis 2). Based on the analysis, 
the estimated synergy level as percentage of Saverglass’ COGS was determined at 6.8% and 
4.5% based on the sales and EBITDA approaches, respectively. We then chose to apply the 
average synergy phase-in percentages of the transactions and set, based on the analysis above, 
the estimated level of synergies to the more conservative result of 4.5% of Saverglass’ COGS. 
However, for the following sensitivity analysis, we chose to show the PV of the underlying 
synergies based on scenarios, ranging from no synergy realisation to 6.8%, the higher result from 
Table 6 (Analysis 2) at different WACCs for the NewCo, which will be explained in the following 
sub-section:10 
 
9 Due to the limited number of transactions with comparable size and announced deal values in the glass packaging industry, we have additionally screened the transaction 
history of other listed packaging players, focused on other packaging materials than glass within the food and beverage industry, including Berry Global, Ball Corp., Silgan 
Holdings, Huhtamaki, Sealed Air, SIG and Crown Holdings for transactions with an enterprise value above €100m 
10 According to the deloitte study “Unlocking the full potential of M&A”, announced cost synergies as percentage of the combined company’s cost of sales are estimated at <1%, 
1-5%, 5-10%, 10-25% and >25% by 27%, 46%, 15%, 10% and 2% of the analysed transactions, respectively 
Synergy analysis 
Figure 13: Synergy impact analysis 
Source: Own analysis and estimates 
As from the perspective of Verallia, the acquisition is only beneficial if Saverglass’ in the future 
expected discounted cash flows exceed the paid acquisition price, we conducted a return 
sensitivity analysis based on the above-described synergy levels and a range of different WACCs 
for the NewCo. Due to the new post-transaction capital structure, we do not believe the use of 
Verallia’s WACC to be appropriate for the analysis. To calculate the NewCo’s implied WACC, we 
determined the necessary beta and capital structure, similar as for Saverglass, by looking at the 
unlevered beta and capital structure of the peer group (incl. Verallia), due to the missing 
underlying market values of the NewCo’s post-transaction capital structure. Depending on 
whether using the average or median of peer data, for the return sensitivity analysis, the used 
WACCs range from the lowest by the peer approach possibly calculated WACC towards Verallia’s 
and Saverglass’ standalone WACCs in order to cover and quantify the impact of various discount 
rates on the valuation of the NewCo. 
Table 7: NewCo enterprise value and return sensitivity analysis 
Source: Own analysis and estimates 
As shown in Table 7, the estimated enterprise value of the NewCo ranges from €5.8bn in the 
scenario of no synergies and Saverglass’ WACC to €7.3bn in the scenario assuming the highest 
level of cost synergies and the lowest calculated WACC. The presented scenarios equate to a 
total return/(loss) of the acquisition of €(1.0)bn and €530m, respectively11. Furthermore, the 
implications of the used discount rate on the NewCo’s valuation are presented in Table 7 
(Sensitivity 3). Therefore, our analysis indicates that the viability of the acquisition is strongly 
dependent on the realisation of sufficient synergies and other variables like the used discount 













Figure 14: Illustrative NewCo enterprise value bridge 
Source: Own analysis and estimates 
For a detailed overview of the NewCo’s financial statements and valuation, please refer to the 
respective section in the Appendix. 
Furthermore, apart from potential benefits for Verallia, resulting from the transaction, 
shareholders could also gain value from the acquisition. Due to Saverglass’ private nature, to 
date, public investors lacked the opportunity to invest in Saverglass on a standalone basis. 
Therefore, as a result of the combination, shareholders are exposed to a new combined company, 
with an increased market share and global presence and, based on the above-described model 
inputs, profit from accretive earnings per share (EPS) and higher dividend payments going 
forward. Table 8 demonstrates the EPS accretion/dilution scenario based on the explained range 
of synergies by year.  
Table 8: Post-transaction EPS accretion/(dilution) 
Source: Own analysis and estimates 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, as a result of the acquisition of Saverglass, shareholders of 
the NewCo are estimated to benefit from higher dividend payments going forward, compared to 
Verallia on a standalone basis, based on a similar payout ratio. Figure 15 quantifies the 
respective figures. 
Figure 15: Illustrative Overview of Estimates Dividend Payments (Verallia vs. NewCo) 










Recommendation for the proposed transaction 
As proven by the respective numbers from our analysis above, we believe an acquisition of 
Saverglass by Verallia could bear fruits, however, only in scenarios of strong synergy realisation 
and other favourable developments, e.g., lower discount rate. Therefore, we see the acquisition 
with a critical view and recommend Verallia to acquire Saverglass, only, and only if, the numbers 
based on further analyses and internally provided data of both companies are more promising, 
as the significant qualitative rationales of the transaction are not alone sufficient to demonstrate 
a viable investment case.  
